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Summary
We examine the extent to which public corruption influences the tax structure of 
American states. After controlling for other tax structure influences, we find that 
states with greater measured public corruption have more complex tax systems, 
have higher tax burdens, rely more heavily on regressive indirect taxes, and have 
smaller shares of their tax burdens with initial impact on business.These are 
significant structural impacts on the tax systems.
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Introduction
Kaufmann (2010) provocatively asks “whether corruption may adversely affect public 
finances in industrialized countries?1)” An abundant literature has focused on corruption 
impacts in developing and transition countries (Bauhr 2016; Börzel and van Hüllen 2014; 
Engvall 2015; Fjeldstad and Tungodden 2003; Ghura 1988; Hopkin and Rodríguez-Pose 
2007; Persson et al. 2013; Sarman and Chaikin 2009; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997; Zhu and 
Zhang 2016) and a new literature is finding impacts of corruption on American state finances 
(Bayoumi et al. 1995; Butler et al. 2009; Depken and LaFountain 2006; Moldogaziev et al. 
forthcoming). This paper extends this examination of corruption impacts by considering 
whether corruption in American states might impact the structures used to raise tax revenue.
Corruption means “misuse of public office for private gain” (Mauro1995) and, given 
the capacity of a tax system to distribute costs among private entities, it would not be 
surprising to find an impact of corruption on that system of distribution. Corrupt officials 
may be susceptible to illegal inducements from private entities interested in changing the 
tax structure to their advantage. Although a number of scholars have investigated the 
causes, consequences, and cures of corruption, corruption impacts on tax systems have not 
been investigated2). Furthermore, the challenges of governance and corruption in the 
industrialized world have been less-examined than has its impact in developing countries 
(Kaufman 2010). If government finance systems can be distorted for private gain, there is 
ample reason to examine whether public corruption might impact the structures used to 
raise revenue for public programs. Moving the cost of government to others can be of 
considerable economic advantage.
Developed countries likely have a higher level of tax compliance and tax morale than do 
developing ones. However, evidence of the impact of corruption on other elements of the 
fiscal system raises a suspicion that tax systems might be influenced as well. It is a question 
not previously examined. This paper fills this gap by examining how corruption affects the 
level and composition of tax revenue in the U.S. state and local governments over the period 
of 1997-20133). We examine how public corruption is associated with the level of tax burden, 
the extent of tax progressivity, and the level of tax evasion by businesses.
1) Daniel Kaufman (2010) of the Brookings Institute asks this question and encourages academic efforts to answer this 
question from various aspects. He predicts several possible ways how corruption can adversely affect public finances of 
the industrialized countries. Particularly, he examines the impact of corruption on budget deficits in EU and OECD 
member countries.
2) Liu (2016) surveys the existing literature about the causes, consequences, and cures of corruption.
3) We chose this period because a consistent database of gross state products (GSP) which are the major tax bases of the 
U.S. state and local governments is available from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) in this period. The 
detail is explained in the section of model, methodology, and data following.    
Corruption and Tax Structure in American States  5
Literature Review and the Logic of Corruption Influence
Businesses and individuals may reduce their tax obligations by three general approaches. 
First, they may take illegal and intentional actions to reduce their tax obligations. They 
may evade “by underreporting incomes; by overstating deductions, exemptions, or credits; 
by failing to file appropriate tax returns; or even by engaging in barter to avoid taxes 
(Alm et al. 2016).” Traditional tax evasion theory is often utilized to explain the 
corruption effects on the tax structure of the developing countries and the transition 
economies (Fjeldstad and Tungodden 2003; Ghura 1988; Tanzi and Davoodi 1997).
Second, they may structure their operations to reduce their tax liabilities through legal 
means. That includes taking advantages of deductions, exemptions, or credits provided in 
the law; by timing transactions to reduce liabilities; by structuring transactions to take 
advantage of lower tax rates provided in the law; and so on. These avoidance actions 
reduce tax obligations but, in contrast to the evasion tactics, are legal within the existing 
law.  Avoidance activities are recognized as acceptable in a Supreme Court case:  “The 
legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his [or her] 
taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.” 
[Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).]
Third, businesses and individuals may reduce their tax obligations by changing the tax 
law so that liabilities are reduced within the scope of that law. That approach requires 
influence on lawmakers and tax administrators and that opens the door for use of corrupt 
practices. If corrupt entities can induce a tax structure favorable to their interests, they can 
reduce their own tax burden as long as the tax structure stays in place and they are freed 
from the need to aggressively practice avoidance or evasion. When there are corrupt public 
officials, this approach may be the most efficient for entities working to reduce tax 
burdens. This impact of corruption is examined here.
While there is a paucity of analysis of the impact of public corruption on tax 
structure, there are many studies on the association between corruption and tax evasion. 
These studies focus on public officials’ “self-seeking” behaviors from taxpayers who have 
the intent to avoid taxation. They follow the household income tax evasion model of 
Allingham and Sandmo (1976): corruption and high tax rates (Chander and Wilde 1992); 
wage incentives system to curb corruption (Besley and McLaren 1993); optimal design of 
tax collection schemes (Hindricks et al. 1999); and size of bribe and tax evasion (Akdede 
2006). Others focus on evasion efforts by firms evade their tax obligations by 
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under-reporting their income and sales, by overstating deductions, and by failing to file 
their tax returns: under-reporting of profits and sales (Rice 1992; Wang and Conant 1988); 
audit selection rules and firm compliance (Murray 1995; Alm et al. 2004); contractual 
relationship between shareholders and tax managers (Crocker and Slemrod 2005); market 
distortion due to tax evasion by firms (Goerke and Runkel 2006); corruption activities by 
firms (Goerke 2008); corruption and tax compliance in the transition economies (Uslaner 
2010); and the association between the size of bribes and corporate income tax evasion 
(Alm et al. 2016; Wu 2005). 
Another group of evasion studies focus on the macroeconomic consequences of 
corruption on taxation, often connecting corrupt activities by public officials with the 
various aspects of their fiscal and tax policies. Allowing tax auditors to accept bribe can 
decrease the amount of revenue collected (Chander and Wilde 1992). Corruption reduces 
the tax collection of governments when corruption contributes to tax evasion, improper tax 
exemptions, or poor tax administration (Alm et al. 1991; Friedman et al. 2000; Gupta 
2007; Ivanyna et al. 2016; Johnson et al. 1999; Sanyal et al. 2000; Tanzi and Davoodi 
1997). In contrast, some studies argue that corruption can reduce tax evasion and increase 
tax revenue as a consequence. When expected benefit from corruption, e.g. bribes, is high, 
a tax collector has incentives to monitor taxpayers more intensively. This increases the 
expected cost to taxpayers of evading taxes, which results in a lower level of tax evasion 
and a higher level of tax collection. This positive effect of corruption on tax revenue 
actually happened in the developing countries (Mookherjee 1997; Chand and Moene 1999), 
although Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2003) conclude that this is a short-term phenomenon, at 
best, and disappears in the long run. 
Most of these macroeconomic analyses examine the association between corruption and 
the level of government tax revenue in developing and transition economies, not developed 
economies. The contexts of the developing and the transition economies differ from that of 
the developed countries. The average tax revenue to GDP ratio in the developed world, 
approximately 35%, is much higher than the developing countries in which the ratios range 
from 12% to 15% (Cobham 2005), possibly because of lower tax evasion in the developed 
societies. Often more than half of the taxes that should be collected cannot be traced by 
the government treasuries due to corruption and tax evasion (Fjeldstad and Tungodden 
2003). Tanzi (1996) notes that corruption may be more common at local than at the 
national level, although less severe in developed countries.
The links between corruption and tax evasion found in developing countries cannot be 
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directly transferred to the United States. The tax morale of Americans, meaning “the 
intrinsic motivation to pay taxes”, is found to be higher than even that of Europeans4), 
which is expected to result in high tax compliance rates in the United States (Alm and 
Torgler 2006). The National Research Program (NRP), a program of research audits 
conducted by the Inland Revenue Service (IRS), estimated that the overall noncompliance 
rate of the U.S. federal individual income tax was around 18 percent in 2001 (IRS 2006), 
which is much lower than that of people residing in the developing countries. Even with a 
lower level of tax evasion and higher tax morale, we believe that public corruption may 
have an impact on taxation through influence on public officials that works to shape the 
tax structure in advantageous ways.  Thus, illegal evasion (or even legal avoidance) is not 
necessary if the legal framework for the tax has itself been attractively constructed.
Hypotheses
Corruption and Fiscal Illusion
We extend the fiscal illusion literature to hypothesize how corruption affects the tax 
structure of the U.S. state governments5). Fiscal illusion implies “systematic, persistent, 
recurring and consistent” misperception of key fiscal parameters by the citizenry due to the 
fact that most significant elements of the fiscal system become largely hidden to the 
citizenry. The idea focuses particularly on significant and regular underestimation of the 
costs of government programs by the citizenry. Public officials are presumed to be 
“self-seeking.” They will design and manipulate fiscal systems to create a fiscal illusion so 
that they may make taxpayers underestimate the actual fiscal burden and support large 
public revenue and outlay in the end and they will be receptive to efforts of private 
entities to shape the tax structure. Fiscal illusion results in a public sector of excessive 
size from this perspective. The literature identifies multiple hypotheses regarding fiscal 
illusion6) (Dell’Anno and Dollery 2014; Oates 1988). 
4) Alm and Torgler (2006) compare the extent of tax morale of Americans with that of people residing in 15 European 
countries, including Belgium, Portugal, Finland, Norway, Netherlands, France, Ireland, Britain, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden, Denmark, Austria, and Switzerland.
5) The intellectual genesis of fiscal illusion is traced back to McCulloch (1845), followed by Puviani (1903), Buchanan 
(1967) and Wagner (1976). A number of studies also have written in the same tradition (Berry and Lowery 1987; Craig 
and Heins 1980; Garand 1988; Misiolek and Elder 1988; Pommerehne and Schneider 1978; Van Wagstaff 1965).
6) They are the complex tax hypothesis, the indirect tax hypothesis (Mill’s hypothesis), the income-elasticity hypothesis, the 
flypaper effect hypothesis, the renter illusion hypothesis, the debt illusion hypothesis, the inflation rate hypothesis, and 
the withholding hypothesis (Dell’Anno and Dollery 2014; Oates 1988)
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Fiscal illusion creates misperceptions about tax structures and that misperception could 
be useful for corrupt public officials.  The officials can pursue their interests (or interests 
of their “clients”) more easily if the public does not accurately perceive the tax structure.  
The fiscal illusion literature concludes that illusion-inducing fiscal structures are “deliberate” 
choices by public officials seeking their own utility. Corrupt officials who are highly 
motivated to maximize their interests are more likely to attempt to create a fiscal illusion. 
A fiscal system creating a greater fiscal illusion is beneficial for their individual 
utility-maximization. Considering detection and punishment, corrupt officials have a strong 
incentive to make the fiscal system more complex and less transparent. This helps them 
hide their corruption. 
Corruption, Tax Complexity, and Tax Revenue
The complex tax illusion hypothesis predicts a potential corruption effect on the level 
of tax revenue. Buchanan (1967: 135) argues that “… to the extent that the total tax load 
on an individual can be fragmented so that he confronts numerous small levies rather than 
a few significant ones, illusionary effects may be created.” Thus, the more complicated a 
tax system, the more difficult it is for a taxpayer to determine the tax-price of public 
outputs, the more likely it is that he will underestimate the tax burden associated with 
public programs, and the larger will be the level of tax collection ceteris paribus. Corrupt 
officials can pursue their utility by exploiting the complex tax illusion. We predict that a 
corrupt government has a more complex tax system than a less corrupt government, which 
helps her raise tax revenue in the end.
∙ Hypothesis I: A U.S. state government with a higher level of corruption is 
likely to have a more complex tax structure, all else being equal.
∙ Hypothesis II: A U.S. state government with a more complex tax structure is 
likely to collect a larger amount of tax revenue, all else being equal.
∙ Hypothesis III: A U.S. state government with a higher level of corruption is 
likely to collect a larger amount of tax revenue, all else being equal.7) 
Corruption, Indirect Taxes, and Tax Regressivity
The Mill’s fiscal illusion hypothesis maintains that “Taxpayers may systematically 
underestimate the tax burden from indirect taxes as compared to direct taxes because 
7) Prior research finds that corruption increases state expenditure (Liu and Mikesell 2014). Therefore, it is not unreasonable 
to expect that corruption will increase tax revenue.  Higher tax revenue provides more spoils to be distributed.
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indirect taxes are incorporated into (and therefore ‘hidden’ in) the prices of goods” 
(Sausgruber and Tyran 2005).  That illusion can be valuable to a corrupt official:  the 
larger the portion of tax revenue from indirect taxes, i.e., taxes on purchase or sale of 
goods and services, the more difficult it is for a taxpayer to determine the tax-price of 
public outputs, the more likely it is that he will underestimate the tax burden associated 
with public programs8). Not only are these taxes generally invisible, they are also generally 
regressive.  Because state and local governments rely heavily on these taxes, they serve to 
hide the cost of government and distribute that cost in a regressive fashion (Decoster et al. 
2010). The average share of the sales and gross receipts tax revenue in total state tax 
revenue the period of 1997-2013 amounts to about 36 percent9). We hypothesize the 
association among corruption, a reliance on indirect taxes, and tax progressivity as follows. 
∙ Hypothesis IV: A U.S. state government with a higher level of corruption is 
more likely to rely on indirect taxes such as sales and gross receipt taxes, 
which makes her tax system less progressive as a consequence, all else being 
equal.
∙ Hypothesis V:  A U.S. state government with a higher level of corruption is 
more likely to rely on indirect taxes because their burden is less visible to 
taxpayers, giving officials greater freedom to manipulate state finances, all 
else being equal.
Corruption, Corporate Income Tax, and Tax Share by Business
An issue of contention in all state tax policy discussions is the balance between taxes 
on businesses and taxes on individuals. This is an artificial distinction because businesses 
act as a conduit of tax burden to individuals, either through higher prices for products 
sold, lower payments by the business for resources purchased from individuals, or reduced 
return to individual owners of the business. However, it has traction in tax structure 
discussions. There are three political reasons for this. First, the burden of tax with initial 
impact on business gets hidden as it is transmitted to individual taxpayers. That violation 
of transparency is attractive to many politicians. Second, a tax with initial impact on 
8) For states and localities, the indirect taxes are included in classification C107 Sales and Gross Receipts Taxes by the 
Governments Division, U. S. Bureau of Census. The U.S. Census (2010) defines the category as “Taxes, including 
‘licenses’ at more than nominal rates, based on volume or value of transfers of goods or services; upon gross receipts, 
or upon gross income; and related taxes based upon use, storage, production (other than severance of natural resources), 
importation, or consumption of goods. Dealer discounts of "commissions" allowed to merchants for collection of taxes 
from consumers are excluded.”
9) The average share of indirect taxes to total revenues in the OECD countries was around 30 percent and that is heavily 
driven by use of national value added taxes in all the countries but the U.S. (Decoster et al. 2010). U.S. state 
governments have relied on indirect taxes more heavily than the OECD countries. 
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business appears to avoid placing tax burden on individual voters. That is also attractive to 
many politicians. Third, the chances tax a tax with initial impact on business will be 
exported to individuals residing in other states is high. That is likely if the tax gets 
embedded in prices charged by the firm or if the tax reduces the return to out-of-state 
owners of the business. In either case, the result is attractive to politicians.  
Higher impact on business is not attractive to businesses and neither is heavier use of 
corporate income taxes. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that businesses, organized and 
individually, would be interested in reducing the business share of state taxes and the 
share of tax from corporate income, even though such structures might be attractive to the 
population. In an environment of corrupt public officials, one approach could be the use of 
illegal inducements to structure the state tax system to the benefit of businesses. That 
approach to burden reduction could be an attractive option in comparison to the ordinary 
devices of evasion and avoidance10). That is the influence to be tested here.  Following 
these arguments, we hypothesize on the association between corruption and business tax 
structure as follows.
∙ Hypothesis VI: The share of the corporate income tax revenue in total tax 
revenue is likely to become smaller in a more corrupt U.S. state government, 
all else being equal.
∙ Hypothesis VII: The share of taxes levied by businesses in total tax revenue is 
likely to become smaller in a more corrupt U.S. state government, all else 
being equal. 
Model, Methodology, and Data
Model and Methodology
Our econometric approach to examining the effect of corruption on the tax structure of 
the U.S. state governments is a dynamic panel regression model, controlling for both state 
and year fixed effects with robust errors. Our data accommodate the period 1997-201311). 
10) In return for bribes and lobby from entrepreneurs, corrupt officials are more likely to design tax preferences to the 
businesses (Belitski et al. 2016).
11) Our choice of the data period is not arbitrary. A consistent database of GSP and its subcategories across the states is 
just available from 1997 since the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) changed her industry classification system 
from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) in 
1997. The 2013 U.S. states tax revenue data across subcategories from the Census are the most recent datasets publicly 
available at the point of our analysis. Thus, we decided to answer our research questions with the data over the period 
1997-2013. 
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The model controls for a multiple sets of covariates including corruption (the key test 
variable), state economic variables (Mahdavi 2013), state demographic variables, state 
political variables (Ho 2003; Merrifield 2000; Sauser 1993), and state fiscal institutional 
variables (Gade and Adkins 1990; Giertz and Giertz 2004; Joyce and Mullins 1991), which 
is as follows12): 
TS = f (corruption; TS in the previous year; real per capita GSP; percent of GSP 
produced in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting†; percent of GSP produced in 
education services, healthcare, and social assistance; percent of GSP produced in 
manufacturing†; percent of GSP produced in government†; percent of GSP produced 
in accommodation†; natural log of state total population; state population growth 
rate; share of state population of age 18-64; natural log of state population 
residing in urban areas; dummy of gubernatorial election years; dummy of 
governor’s party affiliation ; extent of party competition in state legislature; dummy 
of the existence of governor’s veto power; index of state TELs stringency; index of 
local TELs stringency; year dummies; errors), where TS =a measure of tax 
structure.
The U.S. States Corruption and Its Measurement
To measure official corruption across the U.S. state governments, we use the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) publication entitled Report to Congress on the Activities and 
Operations of Public Integrity Section13). The DOJ publishes the annual numbers of 
federal, state, and local officials who are convicted of violations of federal 
corruption-related laws within and across the states. The report understands corruption as 
“crimes involving abuses of the public trust by government officials”, which is consistent 
with the definition of corruption in the literature. The report provides a comprehensive 
record of corruption conducted by public officials in the executive, legislative, and judiciary 
branches14). The US state-level data in this study are measured and collected in 
12) All government finance variables in our model such as the total tax revenue and its subcategories are measured at the 
aggregate levels, i.e., the amounts from state plus local governments. †: To capture the amount of value-added in each 
industry, we just follow the BEA industry classification system, or NAICS. Their industry classification codes are Code 
3, Code 68, Code 12, Code 82, and Code 78, respectively, which is available here: 
http://bea.gov/regional/index.htm.
13) The database is available here: https://www.justice.gov/criminal/pin.
14) The DOJ reports  that the data encompass a wide array of crimes “involving abuses of the public trust by government 
officials”: accepting bribes, awarding government contracts to vendors without competitive bidding, accepting kickbacks 
from private entities engaged in or pursuing business with the government, overstating travel expenses or hours worked, 
selling information on criminal histories and law enforcement information to private companies, mail fraud, using 
government credit cards for personal purchases, sexual misconduct, falsifying official documents, theft of government 
computer equipment for an international computer piracy group, extortion, robbery, and soliciting bribes by police 
officers, possession with intent to distribute narcotics, and smuggling illegal aliens.  DOJ does not divide data by type 
of corruption. 
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homogenous and consistent ways, so they provide us with a panel database which is long 
and large enough to make our econometric models identified.
No available corruption index captures the extent of corruption completely and 
perfectly but convictions, representing a general sample of total corrupt activity in a 
jurisdiction, provide a reliable, relevant, and valid criterion. The DOJ is the most reliable 
and complete source of conviction data for U.S. public officials and it is generally 
accepted that the numbers of convictions are highly correlated with the extent of corruption 
across the states. According to Meier and Holbrook (1992) and Glaeser and Saks (2006), 
state corruption rankings based on the conviction measures match the perception of general 
Americans and professional reporters working in state legislatures. Regarding validity, we 
ran a number of regressions of the conviction measures on caseload, pending rate, U.S. 
attorney’s working hours, the number of judges, and state judiciary expenditure15). The two 
corruption measures are the number of convictions per 10,000 public employees and the 
number of convictions per 100,000 persons of population16). Finding that none of these 
variables are significant determinants of our conviction measures over the period 
1997-2013, we conclude that our convictions measures do not reflect prosecutorial efforts, 
law enforcement/slackness, or courts’ resources but do capture the extent of corruption 
across the states17).   
Table I describes the rankings of the U.S. state governments based on multiple criteria 
in the period 1997-2013, on average. The corruption variable in our benchmark model 
indicates the number of convictions per 10,000 public employees. According to the index, 
the ten least corrupt state governments during the period are New Hampshire, Oregon, 
Nebraska, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, Utah, Washington, Colorado, and South Carolina. The 
ten most corrupt state governments, from the most corrupt one, are Louisiana, Kentucky, 
South Dakota, Mississippi, Montana, Alaska, Virginia, Florida, Alabama, and Pennsylvania18).
15) All these variables are generalized by the number of public employees and the number of state population before 
running regressions.
16) Compared to the second corruption index, the first one works better because we focus on public officials’ corruption. 
Thus, we use the first index for our benchmark analyses.
17) Our conviction measures have a couple of comparative advantages compared to most corruption-related indexes. Most 
existing corruption indicators are measured based on the perception of corruption which should be subjective and 
inconsistent across individuals and societies. The DOJ applies the federal corruption laws, neither state nor local laws, 
and provides objective numbers of convictions which are consistent across states and years.
18) The corruption rankings of state governments based on the second corruption index are not remarkably different from 
those from the first index. The ten least corrupt states are Oregon, New Hampshire, Nebraska, Minnesota, Iowa, 
Washington, Utah, Colorado, South Carolina, and Kansas. The ten most corrupt state governments, from the most 
corrupt one, are Louisiana, Alaska, South Dakota, North Dakota, Mississippi, Kentucky, Montana, Alabama, Virginia, 
and Missouri.
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Dependent Variables
Our dependent variable of the model examining Hypothesis I is measured by the 
generalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) with seven subcategories of tax revenues19), 
which is the most-often used index of tax complexity across the state governments 
(Chapman and Gorina, 2012). The ten states with the least complex tax structure during 
the period are West Virginia, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Alabama, North Dakota, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Idaho, North Carolina, and California.  The ten states with the most complex 
tax structure over the period, from the highest, are New Hampshire, Alaska, Washington, 
Texas, South Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Wyoming, New Jersey, and Florida (See column 
Tax Complexity in Table I).
The dependent variable of the model testing Hypotheses II and III is measured by the 
ratio of total tax revenue to GSP, multiplied by 100, which indicates tax burden across the 
states. The ten states with the lightest tax burden during the period are Delaware, South 
Dakota, Nebraska, Minnesota, Iowa, Washington, Utah, Colorado, South Carolina, and 
Kansas. The ten states with the heaviest tax burden over the period, from the heaviest, are 
Maine, New York, Vermont, Alaska, West Virginia, Hawaii, Rhode Island, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, and Wisconsin (See column Tax Burden in Table I). 
Our dependent variable of the models examining Hypotheses IV and V equals the 
share of sales and gross receipt taxes in total tax, an indication of tax visibility and 
regressivity of the state system. The ten states with the least regressive / most progressive 
/ most visible tax structures during the period are Oregon, Alaska, Delaware, Montana, 
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Maryland, New York, and Virginia. The ten 
states with the most regressive / least progressive / least visible tax structures over the 
period, from the highest, are Washington, Nevada, Tennessee, Louisiana, South Dakota, 
Hawaii, Arkansas, Florida, New Mexico, and Alabama (See column Indirect/ Regressive 
Tax in Table I).
19) We follow the U.S. Census classification of taxes. The seven subcategories are property taxes, general sales and gross receipts 
taxes, total selective sales taxes, individual income taxes, corporation net income taxes, total license taxes, and other taxes. 
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Two dependent variables capture the extent of tax burden levied by firms which are 
used to examine Hypotheses VI and VII. The one measures the share of corporation net 
income taxes in total tax, while the other measures the share of state and local taxes paid 
by businesses in state and local total taxes.20) Businesses in states with high values for 
these variables have been less successful in shifting the balance of tax impact from 
business taxes to individual taxes. Those states offer fewer tax preferences to firms or levy 
structures affording higher impact rates on businesses. According to the Ernst & Young 
index, the ten states with highest business shares are Alaska, Wyoming, North Dakota, 
Texas, South Dakota, Louisiana, New Mexico, Delaware, Washington, and New Hampshire. 
The ten states with lowest business shares are Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Virginia, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Utah, and Arkansas (See column 
Business Share in Table I)21).
20) Ernst & Young LLD in conjunction with the Council On State Taxation (COST) reports detailed state-by-state estimates 
of the state and local taxes paid by businesses for each fiscal year. The estimates (available at http://www.ey.com/) 
include “business property taxes; sales and excise taxes paid by businesses on their input purchases and capital 
expenditures; gross receipts taxes; corporate income and franchise taxes; business and corporate license taxes; 
unemployment insurance taxes; individual income taxes paid by owners of non-corporate (pass-through) businesses; and 
other state and local taxes that are the statutory liability of business taxpayers” (Phillips et al. 2014).
21) According to the corporate income tax share index, the ten states with highest shares are Alaska, New Hampshire, 
Delaware, New York, West Virginia, Massachusetts, California, Tennessee, Michigan, and Illinois. The ten states with 
lowest shares are Washington, Nevada, Texas, Wyoming, Hawaii, Ohio, Missouri, South Carolina, South Dakota, and 
Colorado (See column CIT Share in Table I).
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Rank Corruption (emp.)† Corruption (pop.)† Tax Burden† Tax Complexity† Indirect/Regressive Tax† CIT Share‡ Business Share‡
1 New Hampshire Oregon Delaware West Virginia Oregon Alaska Alaska
2 Oregon New Hampshire South Dakota Oklahoma Alaska New Hampshire Wyoming
3 Nebraska Nebraska Texas Pennsylvania Delaware Delaware North Dakota
4 Minnesota Minnesota Tennessee Alabama Montana New York Texas
5 Iowa Iowa Oregon North Dakota New Hampshire West Virginia South Dakota
6 Kansas Washington Colorado Kentucky Massachusetts Massachusetts Louisiana
7 Utah Utah Georgia Minnesota New Jersey California New Mexico
8 Washington Colorado Alabama Idaho Maryland Tennessee Delaware
9 Colorado South Carolina Missouri North Carolina New York Michigan Washington
10 South Carolina Kansas Virginia California Virginia Illinois New Hampshire
11 North Carolina Nevada Louisiana New Mexico Connecticut New Jersey West Virginia
12 New Mexico North Carolina New Hampshire Missouri Maine Kentucky Tennessee
13 Wisconsin Wisconsin North Carolina South Carolina Vermont Indiana Montana
14 Maine California Utah Mississippi Wisconsin Pennsylvania Arizona
15 Wyoming New Mexico Washington Utah Rhode Island North Dakota Nevada
16 California Michigan Nevada Iowa Pennsylvania North Carolina Oklahoma
17 Idaho Maine South Carolina Virginia Ohio Montana Florida
18 Vermont Indiana Arizona Ohio Illinois Minnesota Mississippi
19 Michigan Idaho Indiana Nebraska Minnesota Mississippi Vermont
20 Indiana Connecticut Oklahoma New York California Arkansas Nebraska
21 Nevada Vermont Iowa Indiana Nebraska New Mexico Kansas
22 Connecticut Georgia Massachusetts Delaware Iowa Arizona Maine
23 Arkansas Arizona Illinois Illinois Michigan Idaho Colorado
24 Hawaii Arkansas Nebraska Michigan Wyoming Oregon Alabama
25 Georgia Rhode Island New Mexico Kansas Idaho Wisconsin Iowa
26 New York Hawaii Idaho Louisiana Indiana Kansas Illinois
27 Massachusetts Massachusetts Kentucky Colorado North Carolina Utah South Carolina
28 Texas Texas California Arkansas South Carolina Alabama Rhode Island
29 Rhode Island New York Florida Wisconsin North Dakota Florida Kentucky
30 Arizona Wyoming Ohio Georgia Colorado Maine California
31 Oklahoma West Virginia Arkansas Maryland Kansas Connecticut New York
32 West Virginia Tennessee Michigan Hawaii Kentucky Nebraska Georgia
33 Tennessee Maryland Kansas Montana Georgia Vermont Idaho
34 Maryland Oklahoma Wyoming Maine Missouri Oklahoma Indiana
35 Ohio Pennsylvania Pennsylvania Connecticut West Virginia Georgia Pennsylvania
36 Illinois Illinois Maryland Nevada Utah Maryland Missouri
37 Delaware Florida Montana Arizona Oklahoma Louisiana Minnesota
38 New Jersey Ohio Minnesota Vermont Arizona Rhode Island Ohio
39 North Dakota Delaware Mississippi Massachusetts Texas Iowa Hawaii
40 Missouri New Jersey Connecticut Rhode Island Mississippi Virginia Michigan
41 Pennsylvania Missouri Wisconsin Florida Alabama Colorado Arkansas
42 Alabama Virginia North Dakota New Jersey New Mexico South Dakota Utah
43 Florida Alabama New Jersey Wyoming Florida South Carolina Wisconsin
44 Virginia Montana Rhode Island Tennessee Arkansas Missouri Massachusetts
45 Alaska Kentucky Hawaii Oregon Hawaii Ohio New Jersey
46 Montana Mississippi West Virginia South Dakota South Dakota Hawaii Virginia
47 Mississippi North Dakota Alaska Texas Louisiana Wyoming Oregon
48 South Dakota South Dakota Vermont Washington Tennessee Texas North Carolina
49 Kentucky Alaska New York Alaska Nevada Nevada Maryland
50 Louisiana Louisiana Maine New Hampshire Washington Washington Connecticut
Table I. The Rankings of the U.S. State Governments (1997-2013, on average)
†: ranks from the least to the highest, based on each index. ‡: ranks from the highest to the lowest, based on each index. Tax burden is measured 
by the tax (state+local) to GSP ratio. Tax complexity is measured by the generalized HHI. The extent of indirect taxes is measured by the share of 
sales and gross receipt taxes in total tax. The CIT share and Business Share capture the the extent of tax burden imposed on businesses.
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Explanatory Covariates and Controls
Table II provides comprehensive information on the dependent and independent variables: 
how to measure them and where to collect them, including descriptive statistics of them. 
Note our regression models include the lagged value of their dependent variables as their 
independent variable. This is to control for one of the most characteristic features of 
government finance, i.e. incrementalism. Most taxes remain in place unless changed 
explicitly by legislative action, making past decisions critical for current law. This variable 
makes our models dynamic panel regressions.
We identify gross state product per capita, multiplied by 100, as a proxy for the major 
tax base of the U.S. state and local governments22). We expect that an expansion of tax 
base of a government will increase tax capacity and tax collections, all else being equal. 
Separate from the aggregate tax base effect, we also add the shares of several sub-categorical 
products in total GSP and examine the impact of economic structure on tax revenue. The 
subcategories are agriculture, education, manufacture, government, and accommodation23). We 
suspect that it is harder to tax the agricultural sector than other sectors including 
manufacturing because of profitability and compliance problems, but retail is easier. Value 
added in education and the government is mostly exempt from taxation. Values produced 
from accommodation may capture governments’ ability to export tax burden through tourists.
Our regressions models include multiple demographic variables of the states. The 
natural log of the state population and the growth of population capture the extent of 
people’s demand for government services, which implies fiscal burden on the governments. 
However, it is also understood as a proxy for economies of scale in publicly provided 
services. The variable named Age 1864 measures the share of the population aged 18 to 
64. Young (younger than 18) and elderly (older than 64) residents demand more public 
provided services such as public education and health care, which implies a higher demand 
for government services. The natural log of the number of people residing in urban areas 
is a proxy for the extent of urbanization, which requires for a higher fiscal burden on the 
governments. It is noteworthy that the literature provides much conflicting evidence of the 
effect of demographic variables on government finance and summarizes that it is not a 
normative but empirical issue, which may depend on data and cases.
22) In order to control for other economic factors, we also ran a number of regressions with personal income, 
unemployment, changes in debt, non-tax revenue, and intergovernmental grants. We do not find any remarkable changes 
in our regression results across the variations. Considering high collinearity between these variables and GSP, we 
decided not to include them into our benchmark models, which is also better for brevity of the result presentation. 
23) To measure the share (%) of each category in GSP, we follow the GSP subcategory classification system of the U.S. 
Census, or NAICS. The categories are as follows: agriculture (agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting), education 
(education services, health care, and social assistance), manufacture (manufacturing), government, and accommodation.
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The set of political and institutional variables includes a dummy of gubernatorial election 
years, a dummy of governor’s party affiliation ( 1 = Democrats, 0 = the others), the extent 
of political competition in the state legislatures24), a dummy of the existence of gubernatorial 
line-item veto, the stringency of state tax and expenditure limits (TELs), and the stringency 
of local TELs25). Politicians prefer expansionary fiscal policies when elections approach. 
Democrats are generally understood to be more generous to government expenditures. 
Political checks and balances make increasing taxes more difficult when there is greater 
political competition. It will be easier for a governor with veto power to reduce government 
spending as she is allowed to eliminate specific expenditures or tax proposals. A higher 
stringency of state and local TELs is expected to result in a more restrictive fiscal 
administration. As noted in Table III, we also control for state fixed effect and year effect.
Variable Label Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Source
Dependent variables
Tax burden Ratio of total tax revenue to GSP, multiplied by 100 750 8.70 1.27 5.92 18.35
Tax complexity Tax complexity, generalized HHI 750 0.87 0.05 0.56 1.01
Indirect/regressive tax
Share of sales and gross receipt tax (%) in total tax 
revenue. Proxy for the extent of indirect/regressive 
taxes; the higher index, the less progressive system
750 35.68 12.35 5.62 64.83
CIT share Share of corporate income tax (%) in total tax revenue 750 3.66 2.55 0.00 22.42
Business share
Share of tax revenue collected from businesses (%) in 
total tax revenue




Corruption (employee) Number of convictions per 10,000 public employees 847 0.50 0.40 0.00 2.73
Corruption (pop)
Number of convictions per 100,000 people of the state 
population
847 0.34 0.30 0.00 2.55
GSP† Gross state product, per capita, multiplied by 100 850 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.08
Agriculture (%)†
Percent of GSP in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and 
hunting (NAICS)
850 1.68 1.91 0.12 12.99
Education (%)†
Percent of GSP in education services, health care, and 
social assistance (NAICS)
850 7.75 1.83 3.21 13.54
Manufacture (%)† Percent of GSP in manufacturing (NAICS) 850 13.38 5.87 1.80 30.59
Government (%)† Percent of GSP in government (NAICS) 850 13.85 3.11 9.17 25.27
Accommodation (%)† Percent of GSP in accommodation (NAICS) 850 1.11 1.78 0.25 14.81
LN(pop) Natural log of state total population 850 15.11 1.01 13.10 17.46
Pop growth State population growth rate 850 0.92 0.78 -5.99 5.87
Age1864 Share of state population of age 18-64 850 0.62 0.01 0.58 0.66
Urbanization Natural log of state population residing in urban areas 850 14.74 1.14 12.17 17.41
Election Dummy of years of gubernatorial election 850 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00
Party Dummy of governor's party affiliation (1=Democrats) 850 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Competition
Extent of party competition in state legislature, 
1 minus the average of proportions of Democrats in 
House and Senate (Clingermayer and Wood 1995)
850 0.50 0.17 0.09 1.00
Veto Dummy of governor's veto power (1=yes, 0=no) 850 0.87 0.33 0.00 1.00
State TEL Index of the stringency of state TELs 839 9.26 8.40 0.00 30.00
Local TEL Index of the stringency of local TELs 842 15.78 10.62 0.00 38.00
All government finance variables are measured by adding state and local values in total. †: We follow the industry classification system 
of the U.S. Census.
Amiel et al. 
(2009)











24) The extent of political competition is measured by “one minus the average of proportions of Democrats in House and 
Senate” (Clingermayer and Wood 1995). Although Klarner (2013) provides a number of other indexes of political 
competitiveness across the states, we adopt the method used by Clingermayer and Wood (1995) after checking that the 
regression results do not show remarkable differences across the variations and those indicators have high correlations. 
The main concern is that those Klarner’s measures have not been updated since 2010.  
25) Many empirical studies argue that the existence of TELs is not sufficient to exert significant influence on government finance, 
although it is different from the intent of the institutions. Instead, we use the measures of the strength of state and local 
TELs, updated by Amiel et al. (2009), which show substantial variations of the measures across the states and localities.  
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Empirical Results
Corruption vs. Tax Burden
Model I in Table III describes how corruption affects the extent of the tax complexity 
in the U.S. state governments in the period 1997-2013. Model II in Table III shows how 
tax complexity is associated with the tax collection of the U.S. state governments over the 
same period. Model III in Table III is our benchmark model examining the effect of 
corruption on state and local total tax burden over the period. In order to the potential 
reverse caulity and simultaniety issues, we use the lagged value of the corruption through 
our regressions26). 
Model I shows a negative association between corruption and the generalized HHI tax 
complexity index. The association is significant at the 0.1% level and means that a state 
government with a higher level of corruption is likely to have a more complex tax system 
(a lower generalized HHI index), thus supporting Hypothesis I. Model II also shows a 
negative association between the generalized HHI tax complexity index and total tax 
revenue. The impact is significant at the 0.1% level and implies that a state government 
with a more complex tax system is likely to collect more  tax revenue. It shows that a 
U.S. state government can succeed in raising a larger amount of tax revenue by making its 
tax system more complex, supporting Hypothesis II. Model III shows that there is a 
significantly positive association between corruption and tax, which is also significant at 
the 0.1% level. This provides significant evidence in support of Hypothesis III.
The regression results of the models I through III are consistent with the fiscal illusion 
theory which argues that self-interested officials are motivated to make the fiscal system 
more complex in order to create fiscal illusion and make taxpayers underestimate their 
actual tax burden, which results in a larger amount of tax collection in the end. A 
government with more corrupt officials are expected to make more efforts to create a 
fiscal illusion, e.g. by making its tax system more complex. A U.S. state government with 
greater corruption is likely to have a more complex tax system and the fiscal illusion that 
results allows a higher tax burden. This implies that U.S. citizens residing in a state whose 
public officials are more corrupt should shoulder heavier tax burden due to public officials’ 
26) One can suspect that the tax structure of a government causes a variation of the extent of corruption. We try to 
address the reverse causality and simultaneity issues by adopting a Granger causality style approach and used a lagged 
value of corruption, instead the contemporaneous level of corruption.  
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corruption.
The regression results of the covariates in our benchmark model, Model III, correspond 
to expectations from the literature. Other than the corruption variable, it appears that the 
significant determinants of tax collection are the first lag of the dependent variable, per 
capita GSP, the shares of products from agriculture, manufacturing, government, and 
accommodation, and the extent of political competition. We interpret the results one by one 
as follows. First, a higher level of tax revenue in a previous year is likely to have a 
positive impact on tax levels in the following year, which makes sense given the 
incremental nature of tax structures. Tax laws remain in place year after year, unless 
legislative action is taken to change them, and that is a relatively infrequent occurance.  
Second, it is natural that a bigger potential  tax base, measured by per capita GSP, should 
produce more  tax revenue. Third, the subcategories of GSP, i.e. agriculture, education, 
manufacturing, government, and accommodation, show a significantly negative association 
with tax collection. The results are open to diverse interpretations. One possible explanation 
is that a government can collect a larger amount of tax revenue through diversified 
revenue sources, rather than a heavy reliance on a specific revenue source. This is relevant 
to the regression result of Model II in Table III. Most demographic, political, and 
institutional variables other than the extent of political competitiveness in the state 
legislatures do not exert a significant influence on tax collection during the study period. 
The check and balance function of competitive state legislatures seems to restrain the state 
governments from increasing tax burden on their residents.
20
b.(sig.) t-value b.(sig.) t-value b.(sig.) t-value
0.47*** 15.7 0.26*** 8.2 0.46*** 13.24
-0.01*** -4.12 0.27*** 4.16
-17.74*** -15.68
0.01** 3.21 10.22 0.99 36.11** 2.95
-0.003 -0.6 -0.10** -3.28 -0.12** -3.42
-0.01 -0.94 0.03 0.4 0.09 1.15
-0.003 -1.11 -0.06*** -4.67 -0.08*** -5.42
0.04*** 5.89 -0.04 -0.96 -0.13** -2.64
-0.03* -1.98 -0.35*** -3.72 -0.28* -2.49
0.02 1.06 -1.09 -1.23 -0.87 -0.82
0.002** 2.61 0.01 0.28 -0.06 -1.24
-0.21 -1.6 -5.73 -1.2 -0.88 -0.16
-0.01 -0.61 0.22 0.39 0.17 0.26
0.001 0.93 -0.01 -0.19 -0.03 -0.47
0.002 1.92 0.02 0.4 -0.06 -1.28
-0.01 -0.93 -1.01** -3.18 -1.27** -3.36
0.003 0.59 0.08 0.49 -0.03 -0.14
0.001 1.08 0.02 1.23 0.02 0.9
-0.0002 -0.19 0.02 0.43 0.02 0.45





Table III. Regression Results and the Tests of Fitness
Corruption and the Level of State and Local Tax Revenues (1997-2013)
Variable
Model IIIModel I Model II
Tax / GSPTax Complexity Tax / GSP
Main






















Fixed effect controlledcontrolled controlled







§: Lagged values of the dependent variables of each model. ♠: Note, the larger the 
index, the less the extent of tax complexity. ♣: Per capita GSP, divided by one million, in 
the models II and III. The ratio of GSP to total state and local tax revenues in the model 
I.  †: Added values of each categorical gross state product (%) in the models II and III. 
The ratio of each categorical gross state products to total state and local tax revenues in 
the model I. *,**,***: significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
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Robustness Checks of the Results 
We used several strategies to assess the robustness of our models and address the 
possible endogeneity of the empirical results in the benchmark model. Tables IV and V 
summarize the robustness check results. We start from Model IV, a simple dynamic panel 
regression model of tax-to-GSP ratios on corruption with controlling for the state fixed and 
year effects. We extend the model to accommodate GSP and the GSP relevant variables, 
Model V. We further added the sets of covariates, i.e. demographic (Model VI), political 
(Model VII), and institutional (Model VIII) factors, set by set. Table IX diplays that the 
positive association between corruption and tax burden remains substantively and 
statistically significant across all nested and non-nested re-specifications. Furthermore, 
instead of the number of convictions per 10,000 public employees, we used the number of 
convictions per 100,000 people in the population as a proxy for the state corruption at 
Model VIX in Table V. Table V also shows a significantly positive association between 
corruption and tax burden27). We also ran a number of generalized method of moments 
(GMM) regressions to control for the potential endogeneity problem of the corruption 
variable28). Model X in Table V is a two-step first difference GMM model. Model XI in 
Table V is a two-step system GMM model. Both models address the small sample bias 
problem. In sum, the significantly positive association between corruption and tax burden 
remains across a number of variations. The regression results of the other factors of the 
state tax burden also correspond with those of Model III in Table III. We conclude that 
the regression results of our benchmark model are consistent and robust.
27) We also ran regressions with multiple time lags for convictions measures such as the conviction measures at time t-3, 
the average of the previous three years’ conviction measures (at times t-2, t-1, and t), and the measures at time t, in 
addition to the measures at time t-1 in the benchmark model. The results are not reported for brevity.
28) One can suspect that a corruption variable in an empirical regression model is endogenous in a sense that the 
corruption variable might be correlated with the error terms of the model due to some omitted variables which are 
associated both with the corruption variable and the errors. One of the most effective ways to address this endogeneity 
is to find valid instruments of the endogenous variable. Utilizing the characteristic features of panel data, GMM 
methods use some appropriate lagged values of the endogenous variable as a valid “internal” instrument of the 
endogenous variable when valid “external” instruments are not available, as our case. Table V shows that models X 
and XI pass most of the required tests for an identified GMM model, i.e. the AR (2) test, the over-identification test, 
the number of instruments test, and the exogeneity test. Although these GMM models are expected to address the 
endogeneity problem, we do not present them as our benchmark model because GMM models work best when the 
panel data have many groups with a short time period, to which our panel data do not comply. Also, the system 
GMM model, Model XI, violates the number of instruments test. The number of instruments should not be larger than 
that of the states, or 50.             
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b.(sig.) t-value b.(sig.) t-value b.(sig.) t-value b.(sig.) t-value b.(sig.) t-value
0.57*** 16.65 0.48*** 13.81 0.48*** 13.82 0.47*** 0.03 0.46*** 13.24
0.25*** 3.73 0.26*** 3.98 0.26*** 3.97 0.27*** 0.06 0.27*** 4.16
47.89*** 4.33 46.70*** 4.02 36.87** 11.88 36.11** 2.95
-0.09** -2.65 -0.10** -2.78 -0.11** 0.03 -0.12** -3.42
0.22** 3.28 0.19** 2.64 0.11 0.08 0.09 1.15
-0.06*** -4.41 -0.07*** -4.58 -0.08*** 0.01 -0.08*** -5.42
-0.10* -2.17 -0.11* -2.26 -0.12* 0.05 -0.13** -2.64
-0.30** -3.21 -0.29** -2.68 -0.27* 0.11 -0.28* -2.49
-0.76 -0.73 -0.84 1.04 -0.87 -0.82
-0.06 -1.32 -0.06 0.05 -0.06 -1.24
1.83 0.33 -0.96 5.57 -0.88 -0.16
0.24 0.36 0.07 0.66 0.17 0.26
-0.02 0.06 -0.03 -0.47
-0.06 0.05 -0.06 -1.28









Table IV. Robustness Checks (I)
Corruption and the Level of State and Local Tax Revenues (1997-2013)
Variable
Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII♠
Tax / GSP Tax / GSP Tax / GSP Tax / GSP Tax / GSP
Main






















Fixed effect controlled controlled controlled controlled
587
Year effect controlled controlled controlled controlled controlled
Observations 598 598 598 598
0.480
0.50
0.987 0.420 0.46 0.478 0.40
0.410
♠: Model VIII is the same with Model III in table III, or the benchmark model. We display the model here again for 
comparison. §: Lagged values of the dependent variables of each model. ♣: Per capita GSP, divided by one million. †: 
Added values of each categorical gross state product (%). *,**,***: significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
F-statistic 29.35*** 26.28*** 21.75*** 165.90*** 17.49***
R-squre
0.416 0.490 0.490 0.490
0.827 0.430 0.45
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b.(sig.) t-value b.(sig.) t-value b.(sig.) t-value
0.46*** 13.27 0.26*** 4.4 0.63*** 11.74
0.47*** 5.32 0.20* 2.37 0.26*** 6.25
35.46** 2.93 116.21** 2.89 34.91 1.46
-0.16** -3.44 -0.13*** -4 0.01 0.24
0.09 1.14 0.67** 3.13 0.14* 2.23
-0.08*** -5.5 -0.10*** -4.6 -0.01 -0.45
-0.13** -2.63 -0.07 -1.19 0.04 1.3
-0.28* -2.53 -0.07 -0.52 0.05 0.57
-0.83 -0.79 3.38* 2.52 1.01* 2.11
-0.05 -1.18 0.01 0.23 -0.03 -1.08
-0.79 -0.14 1.39 0.36 2.2 0.21
0.20 0.3 -0.53 -1.69 -0.96* -2.25
-0.03 -0.49 0.01 0.4 0.02 0.57
-0.07 -1.34 -0.01 -0.2 -0.21*** -3.74
-1.27** -3.4 -0.56 -1.53 -0.04 -0.14
-0.03 -0.14 -0.02 -0.19 0.03 0.19
0.02 0.9
0.02 0.45 0.02* 2.66 0.01 1.27









Table V. Robustness Checks (II)
Corruption and the Level of State and Local Tax Revenues (1997-2013)
Variable
Model IX Model X♠ Model XI♠
Difference GMM System GMM
Tax / GSP Tax / GSP Tax / GSP
Main






















Fixed effect controlled controlled controlled
Year effect controlled controlled controlled





F-statistic 18.23*** 169.76** 1389.05***





§: Lagged values of the dependent variables of each model. ‡: The number of convictions per 100,000 
people of state population in Model IX. The number of convictions per 10,000 public employees in models 
X and XI. ♣: Per capita GSP, divided by one million. †: Added values of each categorical gross state 
product (%). ♠: Model X is a difference GMM model and Model XI is a system GMM. Both are two-step 
GMM models and address small sample bias. ♥: Models X and XI drop state TEL variable automatically 





Corruption vs. Tax Composition
The corruption effect will not be the same across the different types of taxes. The 
Mill’s hypothesis maintains that self-interested officials prefer indirect taxes to direct taxes 
because it is more difficult for taxpayers to assess their actual tax burden from those than 
these. Likewise, corrupt officials are more likely to create a fiscal illusion by designing an 
indirect-tax-oriented tax system and fool taxpayers to underestimate their actual tax burden. 
We use the share of tax revenue collected from Sales and Gross Receipt Taxes (C107, 
Census code) in total taxes as a proxy for the extent of indirect taxes across the states. 
Model XII in Table VI shows a significantly positive association between corruption and 
the share of sales and general receipt taxes in the state and local total taxes, which is 
significant at the 1% level29). A state government with a higher extent of corruption is 
more likely to collect her tax revenue from indirect taxes, which is in support of 
Hypotheses IV and V.
Many tax studies use the share of sales and gross receipts taxes in total taxes as a 
proxy for the extent of tax regressivity. A tax system which relies heavily on these taxes 
is presumed to be regressive, or less progressive. Consumption spending is higher as a 
share of household income for lower-income families than it is for higher-income families. 
This is true not just for total consumption but also for most categories of expenditure.  
The effective tax rates of these taxes are higher for low-income households than that for 
higher-income households. Thus, the distribution of the tax burden is regressive, which 
creates equity problem for the taxes (Mikesell 2014: 447).  In this regard, the regression 
result of Model XII implies that public officials’ corruption is associated with state tax 
regressivity; thus, the tax burden of lower-income households residing in a state whose 
government is more corrupt tends to become heavier than that of higher-income 
households.
We use the share of corporate income tax in the total tax and the share of taxes 
levied by businesses in the total tax as two proxies30) for the tax burden imposed on 
29) The result is consistent in a two-step first difference GMM regression which is expected to control for the endogeneity 
of the corruption variable and address the small sample bias, which is not reported for brevity.
30) There exist trade-offs between the two proxies. The coverage of the business share variable, measured by Ernst & 
Young LLP, is much wider than that of the corporate income tax share variable, so it can capture the extent of tax 
burden of businesses comprehensively. However, the corporate income tax share variable, measured by the U.S. Census, 
provides a longer panel database than the business share variable which is just available over the period 2004 to 2013. 
Table II finds that corporate income taxes have constituted around 4% of the total tax revenue collected by the U.S. 
state and local governments over the period 1997-2014, on average. Businesses have paid around 47% of the total tax 
in the period, on average.  
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businesses. Both models XIII and XIV show that there exist a significantly negative 
association between corruption and the tax burden levied by businesses, which are significant 
at the 5%  and the 1% levels, respectively31). Businesses operating in a state whose 
government is more corrupt are likely to face a smaller share of total tax burden, compared 
to businesses operating in a state whose government is less corrupt. We interpret this that 
businesses operating in the states whose governments are more corrupt are more likely to 
find ways to evade their tax obligations and/or succeed in receiving a larger amount of tax 
preferences from their governments. The results support both Hypotheses VI and VII
b.(sig.) t-value b.(sig.) t-value b.(sig.) t-value
0.70*** 24.82 0.64*** 19.75 0.33*** 6.47
0.43** 2.84 -0.23* -2.39 -0.90** -2.79
0.47** 2.63 0.17 1.52 -0.13 -0.29
-0.55 -0.89 -0.3 -0.76 -2.19 -1.61
1.56 1.25 -1.01 -1.28 -6.86* -1.96
-0.59* -2.17 -0.18 -1 0.79 0.98
-0.12 -0.17 1.36** 2.92 -1.23 -0.59
0.68 0.4 -1.54 -1.41 -5.52 -0.86
-0.87 -0.82 0.42 0.29 27.70*** 3.61
-0.06 -1.24 0.05 0.66 -0.26 -1.13
-0.88 -0.16 8.8 1.08 69.71 1.17
0.17 0.26 -0.41 -0.45
-0.03 -0.47 0.01 0.07 -0.24 -0.82
-0.06 -1.28 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05
-1.27** -3.36 0.39 0.72 -0.01*** 0
-0.03 -0.14 0.14 0.47 -4.55*** -4.35
0.02 0.9 -0.03 -1.02
0.02 0.45 -0.02 -0.29





Model XII Model XIII Model XIV
Sales and General Receipt Tax♠ Corporate Income Tax♠
(Taxes levied by Businesses)(Taxes levied by Businesses)
Demographic
Main





















Fixed effect controlled controlled controlled




§: Lagged values of the dependent variables of each model. †: The ratio of each categorical gross state products to total state and 
local tax revenues. ♠: The share (%) of each tax revenue to total state and local tax revenues. ♣: The dependent variable 
captures the ratio of taxes collected from businesses to total state and local tax revenues. The values are measured by Earnst & 
Young LLP and available from 2004 to 2013. Model XIV droppes the variables of urbanization, state TEL, and local TEL 
automatically, due to collinearity. *,**,***: significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1%, respectively.
Table VI. Regression Results and the Tests of Fitness





F-statistic 17.49*** 27.23*** 19.24***
Observations 587 638 439
31) A significantly negative association between corruption and the tax burden levied on businesses remain 
robust in a two-step first difference GMM regression again, which is not reported for brevity.
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Conclusion
We extended the fiscal illusion theory to explain how corruption affects the tax 
structure of a developed country and examined empirically the effects through the case of 
the U.S. state and local governments. Most existent studies investigating the corruption 
effects on tax structure have focused on the experiences of the developing countries and 
the transition economies, so they adopted the tax evasion theory to explain the phenomena. 
There is room for an analysis of the corruption effects on the tax structure of the 
developed economies. The traditional tax evasion theory seems not to be applicable to the 
developed countries whose compliance tax rates and tax morale are much higher than those 
of the developing countries. Corrupt behavior may allow structuring of tax systems in an 
advantageous way, thus reducing the attractiveness of evasion or avoidance.
The United States is one of the most developed economies and it is found that the tax 
compliance and tax morale of Americans are higher than those of people in the other 
countries. Different from the existing tax evasion literature, we found that a U.S. state 
government with a higher level of corruption is likely to collect a larger amount of taxes. 
Consistent with the arguments of the fiscal illusion theory, a government whose officials 
are more corrupt is likely to design its tax system more complex and succeed in extracting 
more taxes from its citizens thanks to the illusory tax system. Moreover, this kind of 
governments prefer an  indirect tax system to a direct one, which makes its tax system 
more regressive or less progressive as a consequence. However, businesses enjoy a larger 
amount tax preferences and evade their tax obligation thanks to corrupt governments. In 
sum, the corruption of the U.S. state governments results in a heavier tax burden on the 
general public, a more regressive and less transparent tax structure, and a smaller  business 
share of the tax burden, at least in the period 1997-2013.
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